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Homophily and Individual Performance 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We study the relationship between choice homophily in instrumental relationships and 
individual performance in knowledge-intensive organizations. Although homophily 
should make it easier for people to get access to some colleagues, it may also lead to 
neglecting relationships with other colleagues, reducing the diversity of information 
people access through their network. Using data on instrumental ties between bonus-
eligible employees in the Equity Sales and Trading division of a global investment 
bank, we show that the relationship between an employee‘s choice of similar 
colleagues and her performance is contingent on the position this employee occupies 
in the formal and informal hierarchy of the bank. More specifically, homophily is 
negatively associated with performance for bankers in the higher levels of the formal 
and informal hierarchy, whereas the association is either positive or nonexistent for 
lower hierarchical levels.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The tendency to associate with similar others is a well-documented phenomenon in the social 
sciences. Captured in the proverbial expression ―birds of a feather flock together,‖ the phenomenon 
was labeled ―homophily‖ by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954). In a comprehensive review of the 
literature at the turn of the century, McPherson and his collaborators (McPherson et al. 2001) cite 
research using ethnicity, gender, age, religion, education, and occupation. The evidence supporting 
the idea that social ties between similar people are more frequent than between dissimilar people 
continues to accumulate (e.g. Gibbons and Olk 2003, Mollica et al. 2003 on ethnicity; Reagans 2005 
on gender; Reagans 2011 on age; Armstrong and Cole 2002, pp. 174-176, Gibson and Zellmer-Bruhn 
2001, Joshi et al. 2002 on nationality).  
The considerable sophistication in the study and measurement of the attributes and the 
conditions underlying homophily at the relational level contrasts with the lack of attention paid to the 
correlates of homophily at the actor level. This is the case with performance. The few existing studies 
on this topic provide conflicting evidence. In a study of ethnic entrepreneurs in Hamburg, Fertala 
(2007) found that having co-nationals as suppliers was associated with better economic outcomes 
among ethnic entrepreneurs, but having them as clients was not. Gompers, Mukharlyamov and Xuan 
(2012) found that homophily among venture capitalists reduced the probability of investment success, 
especially for early-stage investments, whereas Hegde and Tumlinson (2014) found that ethnic 
similarity between VCs and the start-ups they invest was positively associated with the venture‘s 
performance. Pearce and Xu (2012) found no evidence of association between homophily and 
supervisory ratings, except in cases where the supervisor status was contested by a high-status 
subordinate.  
The paucity of consistent empirical evidence is compounded by the contrasting predictions 
that can be derived from theories that link social ties with outcomes. On the one hand, theories of 
knowledge exchange suggest that the personal affinity that is likely to exist between similar people 
should make it easier for them to access the resources and support required to do their jobs (Hansen 
1999; Reagans and McEvily 2003), which would result in a positive association between choice 
homophily and performance. On the other hand, structural holes theory (Burt 1992) poses that 
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resorting to similar others could compromise the diversity of the resources and information actors 
access through their network, which should result in a negative association between choice homophily 
and performance.  
The presence of two mechanisms that result in opposite relationships between homophily and 
performance poses a challenge to formulating and testing hypotheses about this relationship. If the 
two mechanisms were equally consequential for everybody we should not expect to observe a 
discernible relationship between homophily and performance: what actors gain in access they would 
lose in diversity, and vice-versa. Yet, actors may be heterogeneous in the extent to which they 
experience difficulties in securing access to people who can provide the information and support they 
need to do their jobs, as well as in the extent to which their performance could benefit from the 
diversity of such information. If this is the case, the relationship between homophily and performance 
may be contingent on factors responsible for this kind of heterogeneity among actors.  
While there may be idiosyncratic factors that may create variation in the extent to which 
people are able to secure access to colleagues and to benefit from accessing diverse information 
through those colleagues, their position in the formal and informal hierarchy of the organization 
provides a solid and generalizable ground for theorizing. Actors in the upper echelons of the formal 
hierarchy or those who enjoy high status in the informal hierarchy are more likely to have the 
legitimacy of established ―players‖ in the organization (Burt 1992, Sparrowe and Liden 2005), which 
should facilitate access to the information and resources controlled by other actors. At the same time, 
these actors are more likely to perform tasks for which accessing diverse information is critical (Burt 
1997, Gargiulo et al. 2009). The opposite is true for junior or low-status organizational members. 
They are likely to encounter greater difficulty in gaining the respect and trust of colleagues and less 
likely to perform complex tasks that require accessing more diverse information. This suggests that 
the association between homophily and performance may be negative for employees who occupy 
higher positions in the formal or informal hierarchy of the firm and positive for those occupying lower 
echelons of those hierarchies.  
We test these ideas on a sample of bonus-eligible service professionals in the Equity Sales 
and Trading division of a major international investment bank. The focus on ―knowledge workers‖ is 
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pertinent given the role that informal workplace relationships play in their performance and the 
importance that acquiring diverse information and knowledge has for their ability to learn on the job 
and perform their tasks (Smith et al. 1995, Groysberg and Lee 2008). Research has shown that the 
structure of the employees‘ instrumental networks has a significant association with individual 
performance (e.g., Burt 1992, 1997, Sparrowe et al. 2001, Cross and Cummings 2004, Gargiulo et al. 
2009). We argue that the composition of such networks—understood in terms of comprising similar 
or dissimilar others—may also matter as an additional factor that helps us understand the relationship 
between networks and performance.  
THEORY 
At least since Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) coined the term ―homophily‖ to describe 
people‘s tendency to establish contact with similar others, the phenomenon has been widely 
documented across different settings and kinds of relationships. In their review of the literature, 
McPherson and his collaborators succinctly describe the phenomenon by saying that ―contact between 
similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people‖ (McPherson et al. 2001, pp. 416). 
While an important part of the literature has focused on non-instrumental relationships such as 
marriage (Kalmijn 1998) and friendship (Shrum et al. 1988), homophily is also apparent in 
instrumental relationships within formal organizations (Lincoln and Miller 1979, Ibarra 1992, 1997, 
Brass 1985). Homophily has been observed in the formation of organizational founding teams (Ruef 
et al. 2003), in the frequency of communication among employees in a R&D firm (Reagans 2005), in 
friendship ties among executive MBA students (Gibbons and Olk 2003), and in encounters and 
engagements among business people in a social mixer (Ingram and Morris 2007).  
The mechanisms invoked to explain the high frequency of association between similar people 
include structural constraints and individual preferences (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987). 
Structural constraints highlight the fact that the unequal distribution of people across categories 
creates different opportunities for associations of majority and minority members (Blau 1977, Blau 
and Schwartz 1984). Members of a minority group may be induced to form more ―heterophilous‖ ties 
than their majority counterpart would, irrespective of their preferences. Moreover, the extent to which 
common features bind people together is likely to vary inversely with the size of the group bearing the 
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same characteristics, suggesting that opportunity structures may also affect the salience of a given 
attribute as a source of homophilous preferences (Simmel [1908]1971: 147; Kossinets and Watts 
2009).  
The preference for similar others may be further constrained by other factors that render some 
people more attractive and that are also correlated with observable personal attributes such as gender, 
nationality, or age. This is especially relevant in instrumental relationships, in which people seek to 
obtain access to resources, information, or help that could be provided by the other party. While 
people may seek similar others because they view them as more trustworthy, easier to get along with, 
and predictable by virtue of their similarity (McPherson et al. 2001, Kossinets and Watts 2009, Rivera 
et al. 2010; Makela et al. 2007, Marschan-Piekkari et al. 1999, Piekkari et al. 2005), homophilous 
instrumental ties may also be induced by inequality in the distribution of a valuable resource. If 
certain members of a specific category of people control a disproportionate amount of a valuable 
resource, associations between members of this category may not necessarily be driven by a 
preference to associate with similar others but rather by the concentration of control over that resource.  
Although the very notion of ―philia‖ (one of the words for ―love‖ in ancient Greek) evokes 
preference and hence choice, the acknowledgement of the structural constraints under which such 
choice is exercised led scholars to distinguish between homophily ―induced‖ by the opportunity 
structure and ―choice‖ homophily that captures individual preferences net of the effects of that 
structure (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987). This distinction has an important methodological 
implication: attempts to measure choice homophily should consider the effects of the opportunity 
structure on observed patterns of association between individuals to ensure that the choice homophily 
measure captures individual preferences and not simply demographic or other types of constraints 
(Lawrence and Shah 2017). Choice homophily may vary within individuals, as preferences are not 
necessarily stable personality traits (Brehm 1956, Sharot et al. 2009, Copping et al. 2010). More 
importantly for our purposes, choice homophily may vary between individuals. We will argue that this 
variation may be associated with differences in individual performance.  
The attention devoted to understanding the mechanisms that can help explain associations 
between similar people at the dyadic level has not been matched by the attention paid to the correlates 
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of a preference for homophilous associations at the individual level, and particularly regarding 
performance. Do people who prefer to associate with similar others perform better, worse, or similarly 
when compared to those who do not display this preference? The question has both theoretical and 
practical relevance. From a theoretical viewpoint, the importance of homophilous associations in 
organizational life (e.g. Makela et al. 2007, Marschan-Piekkari et al. 1999, Piekkari et al. 2005) 
suggests that a better understanding of the relationship between homophily and performance is a 
worthy endeavor. From a practical viewpoint, such an understanding can help organizations and 
individuals to design policies and career strategies that consider the potential effects of homophily on 
organizational effectiveness and career advancement. This may be particularly important in large 
service organizations, which typically require collaboration and knowledge sharing between people 
from different backgrounds to serve their customers.   
Theorizing about the relationship between homophily and performance is not straightforward, 
however. Existing models that link instrumental ties to outcomes associated with performance suggest 
contrasting predictions. On the one hand, theories of knowledge exchange emphasize the difficulty of 
establishing and maintaining good communication between the acquirer and the provider of 
knowledge, as well as the fact that transferring knowledge is usually costly for the provider (Szulanski 
1996, Hansen 1999, Reagans and McEvily 2003). Refusing to help outright may be rare as it could 
violate basic norms of collegiality, but providers may still offer perfunctory assistance that is of little 
value to the acquirer. Since homophily may facilitate the communication between the parties while 
increasing the motivation of the provider to transfer the knowledge, this perspective suggests that it 
should have a positive relationship with performance. On the other hand, structural holes theory (Burt 
1992) emphasizes the effect of accessing diverse information and knowledge in achieving superior 
performance. Insofar as a preference for exchanges with similar others may lead an actor to neglect 
―dissimilar‖ people, it may reduce the diversity of information and knowledge accessed by this actor, 
which would result in a negative relationship between homophily and performance.  
The previous discussion points to a potential trade-off between the expected affinity and 
trustworthiness of similar others and the information advantages of a diverse instrumental network. 
The benefits an actor might obtain due to the superior access to information bestowed by 
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homophilous ties might be offset by the costs associated with the loss of diversity that would result 
from neglecting heterophilous contacts. Yet, existing models do not provide conclusive arguments to 
predict the net result of this trade-off. A fruitful way to advance the research agenda in these 
situations is to identify contingencies that may moderate the salience of the competing mechanisms on 
the outcome of interest (Knippenberg and Schippers 2007, pp. 532-33). In our case, this approach 
implies considering factors that correlate with the difficulty actors might encounter in securing access 
to relevant information and opportunities through colleagues and with the importance that the 
diversity of such information might have for succeeding at their jobs.  
Members of knowledge-intensive organizations such as professional services firms can vary 
in their ability to secure access to sources of information and in their need for diverse information to 
do their jobs along various idiosyncratic factors, but their position in the formal and informal 
hierarchy of the firm provides a sound basis for theorizing. In these organizations, junior employees 
typically struggle to ―learn the ropes‖ and to be trusted as legitimate players by senior colleagues. 
Career progression in the formal hierarchy correlates with more significant business and management 
responsibilities, and especially more complex decision scenarios, which entail obtaining and 
processing more and more diverse information. Yet, employees also differ in the status they occupy in 
the informal hierarchy of the firm. While status partly results from past performance, it is also a 
reflection of an actor‘s affiliations (Podolny 1992). More importantly, the correspondence between 
the formal and informal positions in the hierarchy is seldom perfect (Diefenbach and Sillince 2011), 
especially (but not solely) due to differences in status among people in the same hierarchical position. 
Insofar as informal status can facilitate people‘s access to resources and support independently of 
their formal position, each of these two hierarchies may play an independent role in moderating the 
relationship between homophily and performance. We elaborate on this point concretely as it relates 
to our setting in the data section that follows.  
To summarize, the relationship between homophily and performance should be contingent on 
the position actors occupy in the formal and informal hierarchy of the firm. Specifically, we expect 
that that the preference for associating with similar others would be negatively associated with 
performance for actors who occupy higher levels in the formal or informal hierarchy of the firm, 
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whereas the association would be positive for those in the lower levels of those hierarchies. This is 
the hypothesis we test in this paper.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Our data come from the Equities Sales and Trading division of a major international 
investment bank. In 2001, the year of data collection, this division participated in the global primary 
and secondary markets for equity, equity-linked, and derivative products covering about 100 stock 
markets in Europe, the Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the Americas. Each of the employees in our sample 
(whom we refer to as a ―banker‖ for simplicity) works for one of the 41 operational units in the bank. 
Each unit belongs both to a global function (sales, trading, research, or control functions) and to a 
geographical region (e.g. The Americas, Asia-Pacific). We describe the division‘s task and career 
structure below.  
Task and careers in Sales and Trading 
The bankers in our data correspond to the four bonus-eligible ranks in the organization: 
associate directors (AD), directors (DIR), executive directors (ED), and managing directors (MD). 
The hierarchy and titles used for these ranks are similar across Sales and Trading divisions in other 
firms, although directors and executive directors are also named ―vice-presidents‖ and ―senior vice-
presidents‖ in some banks. Associates occupy the lowest rank. They are promoted to this rank after 
spending two or three years as ―analysts‖ (who are not part of our sample) or hired with an MBA. The 
other ranks are occupied by bankers who have gone up the ranks, although in some cases they may 
have been hired from a competitor. The substance of the task in Sales and Trading does not vary as 
much with rank as does the volume of trades or the importance of the clients entrusted to a banker. 
Traders buy and sell stocks and associated equity products for clients or for the bank (also known as 
―proprietary trading‖). Salespeople deal with clients who wish to buy or sell securities and with 
traders who execute these transactions. Research produces the proprietary research to back up 
recommendations to clients or to sell reports directly to those clients; they also create sophisticated 
investment products that can be sold to clients, such as stock derivatives, and analytical models to 
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price securities. Finally, people in the control function aim to ensure that rules and regulations are 
properly followed and manage the risk of the operations.  
Except for the few bankers who have specific management responsibilities (which is very rare 
among associates), career progression in Sales and Trading correlates strongly with the size and the 
complexity of the task assigned, albeit not necessarily with basic the nature of the task (Gutmann 
2013). A junior trader or salesperson does largely the same job that a senior one does, except that he 
or she executes smaller trades (initially on behalf of his or her senior trader) or deals with smaller and 
less demanding clients, often working under the supervision of a senior colleague. Conversely, a 
senior trader would be required to interpret more complex trading scenarios, which would require 
careful consideration of many factors regarding the economy, the industry, and the specific client that 
could affect the decision on what and when to trade, especially in contexts in which the uncertainty 
associated with these factors is high. A similar contrast applies to a junior and a senior person in Sales, 
with the second dealing with larger, more sophisticated, and demanding clients. As the complexity of 
the trading decisions and client demands increase, so does the importance of accessing diverse 
information.  
Although traders need to be certified and pass a regulatory exam, they learn on the job. The 
same is true for salespersons. A well-known guide to careers in Sales and Trading stresses that entry-
level employees learn from others ―what works well in what situations with which individuals‖ and 
are only ―given responsibilities commensurate with [their] ability to get the job done‖ (Kim and 
Rodbard 2007, pp. 21-22). The same guide reminds newcomers that collegial support cannot be taken 
for granted and that ―asking stupid questions‖ is a capital sin in the rough and unforgiving culture that 
characterizes these organizations: ―it‘s very easy to make a bad impression, and the trading desk can 
quickly become an extremely inhospitable environment for interns that don‘t fit in‖ (Kim and 
Rodbard 2007, pp. 90). This also applies to the menial tasks given to newcomers. Getting a coffee 
order wrong may seriously damage the career of an aspiring trader: ―if the kid can‘t even take a coffee 
order, what reason do we have to think that he can take a stock order?‖ (Kim and Rodbard 2007, pp. 
105). A participant‘s account of life in Sales and Trading at the now-defunct Salomon Brothers by the 
end of the 80s (Lewis 1989) reveals striking similarities with the picture that emerges from more 
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recent career guides and testimonies, suggesting that this picture is representative of the 
organizational environment in this business. 
Although present, the formal hierarchy in Sales and Trading is less strict than in the 
traditional investment bank (M&A) side of the business. Those junior employees who can earn the 
trust of clients and colleagues (senior traders, salespeople, and research staff) can be provided with 
opportunities to trade more important stocks or to have their own clients. Excelling at these tasks, 
however, typically requires a good support network to minimize the risk of making mistakes, given 
the on-the-job nature of the learning and the frantic pace of the work. The importance of this network 
is apparent in the career advice of a former head of Proprietary Trading at Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch: ―Ask every single other person on the planet for help, before you go back to your manager‖ 
(cited in Clarke, 2017). As the task gets bigger and more complex, so does the cost of making errors, 
which increases the need for accessing more diverse information throughout the bank. A high-status 
associate is more likely to be taken seriously by bosses and colleagues, opening opportunities that 
may not be available to lower-status peers in his or her same formal rank—such as covering a senior 
trader‘s position while he or she is on vacation or being taken to important client visits by a senior 
salesperson (Kim and Rodbard 2007, pp. 105). In an industry in which nearly half of the junior 
bankers quit within the first three years and in which newcomers who cannot earn the trust of senior 
colleagues can be sometimes relegated to (literally) fetch coffee for months, a high-status employee is 
more likely to get the attention from colleagues and other senior people. While high status is partly 
the result of prior superior performance, support networks play an important role in having the 
opportunity (and the ability) to display such performance.    
Traders and salespeople need to collaborate to set a price for the security being traded that 
would leave the customer happy and still make a profit for the trader, but ultimately this is a zero-sum 
game: the gain of the client is the loss of the trader. They also have different performance metrics. 
Traders make a profit by buying low and selling high; salespeople receive commission on the volume 
of the trade. This forces bankers to strive for a delicate equilibrium in a game in which, in the words 
of a salesperson, ―everyone likes to keep their cards pretty close to the vest‖ (Kim and Rodbard 2007, 
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pp. 43). Not surprisingly, trust in the other person‘s ability and intentions is paramount in a 
relationship that is rife with potential conflict, especially when not everybody is making money.  
Data 
Cognizant of the importance of collaboration among their employees and of the barriers to 
collaboration created by the nature of the task and incentives, investment banks have implemented 
tools to measure the value bankers add to each other. Central among these tools is a method of cross-
evaluations by which each banker evaluates the value that individual colleagues have added to his or 
her own work in the past year or any other period (see Kane and Lawler 1978, for a discussion). In the 
bank our data come from, bonus-eligible bankers (associates and above) are asked to identify 
colleagues with whom they have had ―substantial business interactions‖ during the previous year and 
to evaluate these colleagues based on their ―real contribution to your business, not their popularity, 
not their reputation, and not your perception of their contribution to the business as a whole‖ (official 
bank document, emphasis in the original). The system displays a roster with the full names of the 
colleagues a banker may evaluate, organized by operational units. To prevent ―grade inflation‖ (Kane 
and Lawler 1978), the system forces bankers to place colleagues in one of four quartiles, allocating 
approximately equal numbers of colleagues to each quartile. The response rate for the year of our data 
was 98 percent.  
The bankers in our sample faced some limitations in that they could evaluate only a subset of 
operational units (including the banker‘s own unit), which were likely to have regular interactions 
with the focal banker‘s unit to conduct the business. For example, someone in a regional or country 
sales unit will rate people in the corresponding regional research and trading units, as well as their 
global counterparts (e.g. Global Economic Research). The practical implications of these limitations 
were modest, however: on average, each banker had a list of about 890 colleagues from which to 
choose from. Bankers were free to evaluate anybody within these constraints, reflecting the fact that 
their business exchanges are seldom mandated by a formal task structure matching people or jobs, 
unlike the case in a more traditional organization. If such a clear structure were present, the liberty to 
choose from such a large pool of colleagues would have been superfluous, as the bank would have 
known whom each person should evaluate and would display only that list to the evaluator. Although 
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the specific nature of a transaction may rule out some colleagues and favor others as potential sources 
of help, bankers have considerable degree of autonomy in choosing whom to associate with, making 
this setting adequate for studying the correlates of homophilous choices. The bank considers the 
number of ―votes‖ (i.e., how many people evaluated the focal banker) and the average rating received 
in these cross-evaluations in the bonus allocation process, which takes place about two months after 
the evaluation exercise.  
Consistent with the wording of the instructions, we interpreted an evaluation from banker i 
(ego) to banker j (alter) as an indicator of the presence of a directed instrumental tie where ego sought 
input from alter. In principle, it could be possible that an evaluation would reflect a banker‘s 
acknowledgment of unsolicited help offered by a colleague. This, however, is extremely unlikely in 
the competitive environment of investment banks. Interviews with industry participants, career advice 
guides (e.g. Kim and Rodbard 2007) and testimonial descriptions of the Sales and Trading work 
environment (e.g., Lewis 1989), as well as the very existence of evaluation systems aimed at 
promoting collegial help, attest to the difficulty of securing help in these organizations and suggests 
that offering unsolicited help is a rare occurrence in these organizations. We used the dyadic 
evaluations collected by the bank to create a square matrix in which cell i,j is set to 1 if banker i 
evaluated banker j and to 0 otherwise. In addition, we collected data on personal and organizational 
background on the bankers, as well as on individual performance.  
Measuring choice homophily 
Although scholars largely agree on the conceptual definition of homophily, empirical 
measures show considerable variation (Lawrence and Shah 2017). An adequate measure of individual 
―choice‖ homophily requires accounting for the constraints posed by the opportunity structure on such 
choices. The most common constraints result from the unequal demographic distribution of people 
across categories. However, measuring choice homophily in instrumental relationships may pose 
additional constrains grounded in the unequal distribution of valuable resources across those 
categories. For example, males may build instrumental ties with other males because they are males 
or because they control a disproportionate amount of a valuable resource, but only the first association 
would indicate a preference for exchanges with same-gender partners. In addition, choices may be 
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motivated by the endogenous tendencies of network formation, such as reciprocity and transitivity 
(Lusher and Robins 2013). Take A and B, both of whom are female; A may choose B because B had 
chosen A, or because both share a tie with C, and not necessarily because they are both female. Our 
measure of homophily attempts to take these aspects into account by identifying preferences for 
similar others that cannot be attributed to the constraints posed by demographic factors, geographical 
proximity, or resource heterogeneity factors, as well as by the network structure in which instrumental 
exchanges happen. 
Conceptually, we measure the choice homophily of banker i (ego) with respect to attribute h 
as function of the change in model fit that results from including or excluding an indicator of 
similarity hij in a logistic model predicting i‘s dyadic instrumental ties with j (alters). We use the 
coefficient of discrimination (Tjur 2009) to measure model fit, an intuitive statistic conceptually 
related to the familiar R
2
 used to assess fit in OLS models (see Allison 2013 for discussion). The 
intuition behind this coefficient is that a ―good‖ logistic model should generate predicted probabilities 
𝜋 that are close to 1 for ―successes‖ (i.e., for observations in which y = 1) and close to 0 for ―failures‖ 
(y = 0). For a given model, the coefficient of discrimination D is the difference between the mean of 
the predicted probabilities 𝜋 for successes and the mean of those for failures: 𝐷 =  𝜋 (𝑦=1) −  𝜋  𝑦=0 , 
with 0 ≤ D ≤ 1. The more D approaches 1, the better the model fit.  
Measuring choice homophily Hi(h) for banker i and attribute h involves the following steps. 
First, we estimate a ―full‖ logistic regression predicting the probability that banker i cited banker j as a 
function of demographic similarity on h (e.g., gender) and a vector of controls that capture other 
factors that might have induced i to cite j, including similarity along other measured attributes. 
Second, we obtain the predicted probabilities 𝜋 for each dyad in the bankers‘ risk set. Third, we 
estimate a ―reduced‖ model removing the demographic similarity indicator h from the full model and 
obtain the respective probabilities. Fourth, for each banker i, we compute two coefficients of 
discrimination 𝐷𝑖 =  𝜋 𝑖,(𝑦=1) −  𝜋 𝑖, 𝑦=0 , based on the mean of the predicted probabilities from the 
full and the reduced model respectively, aggregated to the level of an individual banker. Fifth, we 
compute banker‘s i choice homophily score Hi as the difference between the coefficients of 
 15 
 
discrimination for the full and for the reduced model, Hi, = Di(F) - Di(R).  It is worth noting that this 
measure allows for the possibility that the reduced model could predict a banker‘s choices better than 
the full model does, which would yield negative Hi scores. These bankers are simply less likely to 
form homophilous instrumental ties along attribute h. The higher Hi, the more homophily along h 
explains i’s choices of instrumental relationships. 
An important substantive choice when computing the logistic models to generate predicted 
probabilities is determining the reference group for banker—that is, the subsample on which these 
models would be estimated. Using all the bankers in our sample as reference group would not be 
suitable in our case, as this may obscure the effect of subcultures or other unobserved factors that vary 
across organizational or geographical units and which may shape a banker‘s choices. Therefore, we 
assumed that the tendency to seek similar others may vary across organizational units and estimated 
separate models for each of the 41 organizational units in our sample. Each of these 41 subsamples 
includes all ordered dyads in the risk set of bankers in the focal unit—that is, all possible ordered 
dyads {i,j} in which i is a member of the focal unit and j is a member of the units that could have been 
rated by i according to the constraints imposed by the bank in the cross-rating exercise (which 
includes colleagues in i’s unit). In practical terms, this approach compares each banker‘s choice 
homophily with the average for his or her own business unit. Our approach allows for differences in 
the effects of each homophily indicator, as well as for those of the control variables across subsamples. 
On average, each of these subsamples contains 33,770 observations. Each of these observations 
correspond to an ordered dyad composed by a banker from the focal unit (ego) and all the possible 
colleagues he or she could rate (alters), including those in the same focal unit.  The average size of a 
business unit is 45 bankers.  
Following the procedure described above, we computed three choice homophily scores for 
each banker based on nationality, gender, and age similarity respectively, and a vector of controls. 
Gender and age are two standard demographic indicators to define similarity, whereas nationality is 
likely to be a salient attribute in contexts that bring together people from different countries and 
cultures, as it is the case with multinational organizations like the one analyzed in this study (Erez and 
Earley 1993, Armstrong and Cole 2002, Gibson and Zellmer-Bruhn 2001, Joshi et al. 2002). Same 
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nationality and Same gender are set to 1 if i and j are of the same national origin (or same gender) and 
to 0 otherwise. Same age is set to 1 if j‘s age is one half of a standard deviation younger or older than 
the focal banker i. Since the standard deviation of age is 6.51 years in our sample, Same age is set to 1 
for two bankers if their ages are three or fewer years apart (so if j is up to three years older or three 
years younger than i). We use an age band instead of using absolute differences because this allows us 
to use the same criterion to define the respective demographic control—that is, the proportion of 
―similar‖ eligible colleagues in ego‘s risk set. These proportions are clearly defined for dichotomous 
indicators such as nationality or gender, but not for age. In all three cases, the dependent variable is 
the presence or absence of an instrumental tie in the ordered dyad i,j. This variable is set to 1 if banker 
i evaluated banker j and to 0 otherwise. The control variables account for demographic, organizational, 
and network factors that could have induced bankers to form instrumental ties, including the formal 
reporting structure. The controls also include the two other potential sources of choice homophily we 
investigate. The full models fit the banker‘s choices reasonably well, with coefficients of 
determination (Tjur 2009) ranging from 0.42 to 0.72 (0.53 mean, 0.07 standard deviation).  
Table 1 provides a succinct description of these control variables. An examination of these 
variables reveals that our approach to measure choice homophily removes many factors that might 
have induced bankers to choose ―similar‖ others (including network effects such as reciprocity and 
transitivity) that might be correlated with similarity. Therefore, the variables retained in the ―reduced‖ 
models can absorb part of the variance that might be rightfully attributable to similarity. This results 
in a conservative measure of choice homophily, as the difference between the coefficients of 
determination that defines our measure should be equal to or lower than (but not higher than) the 
marginal effect of the specific homophily indicator in explaining the banker‘s choices in the full 
model. Like the most sophisticated measures of homophily (Lawrence and Shah 2017), our approach 
considers both the opportunity structure and individual preferences. Unlike most existing measures, 
however, our definition of the opportunity structure goes beyond demographic characteristics to 
simultaneously remove the effect of factors like network structures and similarity across other 
characteristics that might have induced the observed associations between bankers. This allows us to 
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isolate the unique contribution of each specific similarity indicator to explain the observed pattern of 
instrumental ties for each actor.  
---------- Insert Table 1 here --------- 
Variables in Models that Estimate Performance 
Dependent variable 
Performance is the dependent variable in the analysis. We measure performance as the 
natural logarithm of the z-sores of the banker‘s annual bonus, rescaled to eliminate values that were 
equal or below zero. Bonuses are the primary way in which investment banks recognize variation in 
individual performance during the year. In the organization we studied, bonus decisions occur about 
two months after the cross-evaluation exercise. Typical for the industry, the distribution of bonuses is 
strongly skewed in our sample: the top earner received a bonus that was 13.23 standard deviations 
above the mean, whereas the bonus of the lowest earner was only 0.63 standard deviations below the 
mean, which indicates the suitability of the log transformation of the z-scores.  
Independent variables 
 Choice Homophily measures the extent to which a banker‘s instrumental relationships 
reflected preferences for same nationality, same gender, or same age category among eligible 
colleagues. We computed a separate choice homophily score for each of these three dimensions.  
Formal rank. We capture the position of a banker in the formal hierarchy using their formal 
rank in the organization. In ascending hierarchical order, these ranks are associate director (AD), 
director (DIR), executive director (ED), and managing director (MD). We use dummy variables to 
capture formal rank, with MD as the omitted category in the models.  
Status. We measure the banker‘s position in the informal hierarchy using Bonacich‘s (1987) 
centrality measure, which is commonly used to capture the status of actors in an informal hierarchy 
determined by the actor‘s pattern of associations (Podolny 1993, 2005; Sauder et al. 2012). The more 
a focal banker is rated by colleagues who are also rated by many other colleagues, the higher is this 
banker‘s status. The measure is calculated as follows: 
𝒄 𝛼, 𝛽 =  α 𝛽𝑘
∞
𝑘=0
𝑹𝑘+1 𝟏 
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Where R is the binary relational matrix constructed using the rating data, α is a scaling factor 
set to make the sum of squared status scores equal to the number of nodes in the network, and β is a 
weighting factor that determines the extent to which the centrality of an actor‘s contacts affects the 
actor‘s centrality score. Following common practice in the status literature, we set  equal to three-
quarters of the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of the relational matrix. We divided the status 
scores by one thousand to facilitate the reporting of the coefficients and standard errors.  
Control variables 
Demographic control variables. We control for the banker‘s Age (in years), Gender (set to 1 
for females), and Nationality, using an indicator variable for each of the 47 nationalities represented 
in our estimation sample for bonuses. 
Organizational control variables. The average rating bankers receive from colleagues is used 
by the management in their bonus deliberations. Thus, Average rating received controls for the 
average score the banker has received from the colleagues who have rated him or her. Controlling for 
this rating is important because it is explicitly considered (along with the number of people rating the 
banker, which we also control for) when determining bonuses. A banker‘s performance is likely to be 
affected by the inputs provided by the colleagues who help this banker. We control for this factor 
using Alters’ average rating received, which is the mean of the average rating received by all the 
colleagues rated by the focal banker. Some bankers were responsible for supervising the work of their 
colleagues, which might affect their bonuses. Direct reports controls for this factor using a count of 
the number of colleagues directly supervised by the banker. Finally, Tenure (in years, logged) 
controls for the banker‘s experience in the organization.  
Social network control variables. The density of ties among the people a banker relies upon 
for inputs (i.e., the colleagues a banker rated) and among those who seek inputs from the banker (i.e., 
those rating the banker) can affect performance (e.g., Burt 2007, pp. 132-139, Gargiulo et al. 2009). If 
a banker with a high choice homophily score gets help from a set of similar colleagues who also help 
each other, estimates of the relationship between choice homophily and performance may instead 
capture the effects of network density. Hence, controlling for network density among the people 
providing inputs to the focal banker is important to obtain accurate estimates of the relationship 
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between choice homophily and performance. Network density acquirer is the ratio between the 
number of existing ties among alters rated by the focal banker and the maximum possible number of 
ties among those alters, whereas Network density provider computes the same ratio for bankers 
seeking inputs from ego. We also control for the size of the banker‘s acquirer and provider networks. 
Network size acquirer controls for the number of colleagues rated by ego, whereas Network size 
provider controls for the number of colleagues who rated ego. Controlling for this is important also 
because management considers the number of ratings received by a banker (along with the average 
value of those ratings) in bonus deliberations. We use a log transformation of the size and density 
measures to compensate for the skewed distribution of the network size scores. Finally, a banker‘s 
performance may be affected by the extent to which he or she engages in reciprocal knowledge 
exchanges with colleagues, which should create incentives for colleagues to help the banker. Thus, we 
control for Reciprocal ties, defined as the proportion of reciprocated ties in the banker‘s network.  
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and the correlations for these variables.  
--------------- Insert Table 2 about here -------------- 
Model Estimations 
We use a multilevel hierarchical linear model (also known as multilevel mixed effects model) 
with a maximum likelihood estimation to account for the nested structure of the data and to obtain 
unbiased estimates for the standard errors of the regression coefficients (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). 
The 1,745 bankers in our estimation sample are nested within 41 operational units and there are 
significant differences in the size of bonuses across units (p < 0.001), reflecting the nature of their 
work and the market conditions in which each unit operates. Our multilevel models specify the 
operational unit of the banker as the identifier that allows for random intercepts, such that bankers are 
nested in these units and capturing potential differences in bonuses across units. As an alternative to 
this multilevel estimation, we also ran our models using an OLS estimation with unit fixed-effects. 
All the significant coefficients we refer to below remain significant in these models.  
--------------- Insert Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2 about here -------------- 
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RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the results of our analysis of the moderating effect of formal rank and 
informal status on the relationship between choice homophily and performance. Model 1 is a baseline 
model. As expected, bonuses in investment banking are strongly influenced by rank (with MD being 
the omitted category). The coefficient for status is also positive and highly significant (p < 0.001), 
indicating that the position a banker occupies in the informal hierarchy of the firm has an independent 
effect on performance. Age, tenure, and being female, all have a significant negative impact on 
bonuses. Because rank is held constant, the negative coefficients for age and tenure reflect the 
detrimental effect of remaining in the same rank for a long time—indeed, the simple correlation 
between these variables and performance is positive (r = 0.26 and 0.16 respectively). This is not true 
for females (r = -0.15), reflecting the compensation gender gap in the industry. Network size provider 
(i.e., the number of people rating the banker) and the average rating received are both positive and 
significant, reflecting the fact that the bank considers these factors in determining bonuses. 
Interestingly, the proportion of reciprocal ties has a negative effect on performance: the more bankers 
rely on people who also rely on them for inputs, the more their performance suffers. This is consistent 
with the idea that factors that may restrict access to diverse information (such as relying on 
reciprocation) can hurt performance.  
Model 2 introduces the choice homophily measures for nationality, gender, and age. None of 
the coefficients of these measures are statistically significant. This is consistent with our expectation 
that the relationship between homophily and performance, if any, should be contingent on the position 
the banker occupies in the formal or informal hierarchy of the firm.
1
 Models 3-4 present the 
contingent relationship between nationality homophily and performance by formal rank and informal 
status, whereas Models 5-6 and 7-8 do the same for gender and age homophily respectively. 
Managing director (MD) is the omitted category in all models presenting interactions with formal 
rank. Therefore, the coefficient for the specific homophily indicator (nationality, gender, or age) in 
                                                     
1 
 We also explored the possibility that homophily could have a curvilinear relationship with performance. To 
this end, we added quadratic terms for nationality, gender, and age homophily to the models. None of these 
quadratic terms was statistically significant at conventional levels (p > 0.19).
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these models shows the net effect of homophily on performance for MDs, whereas the coefficients for 
the interaction terms show the extent to which the effect of homophily for the specific rank (associate, 
director, or executive director) might be statistically different from the baseline effect for MDs.  
Model 3 presents the interactions between nationality homophily and formal rank. Nationality 
homophily has a negative effect on performance for MDs (p < 0.001), as captured by the main effect 
of this variable. The positive and significant coefficients (p < 0.001) for the interactions between 
nationality homophily and the three lower ranks suggest that the effect of nationality homophily on 
performance is less detrimental for these ranks than it is for MDs. Post estimation tests show that the 
net effect of nationality homophily on performance is not significantly different from zero for 
directors or executive directors, suggesting that the performance of bankers in these ranks is not 
related to their preference for co-nationals in their instrumental networks. The net effect of nationality 
homophily on performance for associates is positive, although it falls short of conventional statistical 
significance levels (β = 0.012, 1.59 z-value, p = 0.11). These results suggest that nationality 
homophily reduces bonuses for MDs, whereas it has a marginally positive effect on the bonus of 
associates, which is consistent with our predictions. Interpreting the size of these net effects is 
straightforward, given that both the dependent and the independent variable are standardized and that 
the first is logged. Thus, an increase of one standard deviation in nationality homophily decreases MD 
bonuses by 6.8 percent of a standard deviation, that is, 100(e-0.07 - 1). This is noticeable if we consider 
that 68 percent of the variation in bonuses is explained by rank in our sample, a figure that is 
consistent with the one reported by Burt (1997) for a similar sample of investment bankers. The 
corresponding net coefficient for associates suggests that one standard deviation in nationality 
homophily would increase their bonuses by 1.2 percent of a standard deviation. While small, this 
percentage is not negligible if we consider the tight distribution of bonuses among associates when 
compared with the rest of the sample, which ranges from -0.63 to 0.52 standard deviations from the 
mean for associates (against -0.63 to 13.23 for the whole sample). 
The large standard error of the estimate suggests that there is substantial variability in the 
extent to which associate directors might benefit from nationality homophily. This impression is 
consistent with the results for informal status presented in Model 4. The interaction between 
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nationality homophily and status is negative and significant (-4.57 z-value, p < 0.001). Figure 1 
illustrates the interaction effect between nationality homophily and status on performance. The figure 
displays estimates of performance for bankers with high (mean plus one standard deviation) and low 
(mean minus one standard deviation) status. The vertical dashed lines delimit the region comprising 
98 percent of our observations. A closer examination shows that the net marginal effect of nationality 
homophily on performance is negative and significant (p < 0.05) for the 400 bankers in the top 22.9 
percent of the status distribution and positive for the 54 bankers in the bottom 3.1 percent. Relaxing 
the significance criterion (p < 0.10) shows that nationality homophily has a negative effect on 
performance for bankers in the top 25.9 percent of the status distribution and a positive effect for 
those at the bottom 13.4 percent. The rank distribution of the 54 low-status bankers who benefit from 
nationality homophily using the more stringent criterion for statistical significance shows that they are 
mostly associates (61 percent) and directors (35 percent), which is consistent with our theory. The 
opposite is true for the 400 high-status bankers who suffer from homophily: the majority in this group 
are MDs (35 percent), followed by EDs (28 percent), whereas associates represent only 10 percent. 
These results suggest that the relatively weak results for the interaction between nationality 
homophily and formal rank may be driven by the variation in informal status within ranks, which is 
consistent with the less hierarchical nature of Sales and Trading division as compared with traditional 
investment banking (M&A).  
Model 5 presents the interactions between gender homophily and formal rank, with MD being 
the omitted category. The coefficient for the main effect of gender homophily shows that it does not 
have a significant effect on performance for MDs. The effects for the other three ranks are not 
significantly different from that of MDs either, suggesting that gender homophily does not have a 
contingent effect on the performance of bankers according to their formal rank. The interaction 
between gender homophily and status, however, is negative and significant in Model 6 (-2.14 z-value, 
p < 0.05), which is consistent with our prediction. Figure 2 illustrates the interaction effect between 
gender homophily and status on performance. The figure displays estimates of performance for 
bankers with high (mean plus one standard deviation) and low (mean minus one standard deviation) 
status. The vertical dashed lines delimit the region comprising 98 percent of our observations. The net 
 23 
 
effect of gender homophily on bonuses is negative and significant (p < 0.05) for the 111 bankers in 
the top 6.3 percent of the status distribution and positive and significant for the 54 bankers in the 
bottom 3.1 percent. These figures climb to 18.3 and 17.6 percent respectively when the criterion for 
statistical significance is p < 0.10.  
The distribution of the 54 low-status bankers for whom there is a significant positive net 
effect of gender homophily on performance reveals a similar pattern to the one observed for 
nationality, with 96 percent of these bankers occupying the lower ranks (associates or directors). The 
high-status bankers whose performance is negatively affected by gender homophily are mostly MDs 
(81 out of 111 of these bankers, or 73 percent). Among these, 9 are female and 72 are male. Because 
there are a total of 10 females and 134 males in the MD rank, these results might suggest that the 
performance of female MDs suffers disproportionally based on their gender homophily, even though 
their mean homophily score is not significantly different from that of their 72 male colleagues. While 
we cannot rule out this possibility, the data suggest that an alternative interpretation is more likely. In 
fact, the female MDs have significantly higher informal status than male MDs in the sample (p < 
0.05), which is consistent with the idea that only truly exceptional females are likely to reach this 
male-dominated rank. This suggests that the comparatively large proportion of female MDs whose 
performance suffer from gender homophily do so because of their high status, rather than because of 
their gender. 
Finally, Model 7 shows the contingent effects of age homophily on performance by rank. The 
coefficient for the main effect of age homophily reveals that this variable does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the performance of MDs, the omitted category in the interactions. The effects of 
age homophily for the other three ranks are not significantly different from the effect for MDs either, 
suggesting that the performance of bankers does not vary with their level of age homophily, 
irrespective of their rank. Model 8 shows that that the interaction between age homophily and status is 
also not significant. (We also investigated these models for the effects of age homophily using 
alternative age bands to operationalize the Same age indictor in our models to construct the [choice] 
homophily measure: using four, five, or six years‘ difference, in either direction [younger or older] 
between ego and alter, instead of the three years. None of the measures that result from using these 
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alternative bands produce significant results either; the interaction between status and age homophily 
is not significant in any of these cases, likewise the effects of age homophily for any of the lower 
ranks are not significantly different from that for MDs in any of these cases, and the effect for MDs 
itself is not significant.) Unlike the case for nationality homophily and gender homophily, we did not 
find support for the contingent relationship between age homophily and status in our sample.
2
 
The fact that the results are only marginally supportive for gender homophily and negligible 
for age homophily merits attention. A possible reason for these results is that, unlike nationality, 
gender and age similarity are weak predictors of tie formation in our data. On average, the baseline 
odds of observing an instrumental tie increase 61 percent for same-nationality dyads. The 
corresponding figure for same-gender dyads is 40 percent and it drops to 20 percent for age similarity. 
If similarity on a specific attribute is not a strong predictor of tie formation, it is unlikely that it would 
be correlated with actor-level outcomes as predicted by our model, which is indeed the case with our 
sample. 
Taken together, our results provide support for the contingency model of the relationship 
between homophily and performance. When similarity is a significant predictor of instrumental tie 
formation, as is the case with national origin (and to a lesser extent, gender) in our sample, homophily 
is negatively related with the performance of bankers at the top and positively related with the 
performance of those at the bottom of the formal or informal hierarchies. The relationship is less 
apparent (or altogether absent) when similarity is a weak predictor of tie formation, as is the case with 
gender and age. The fact that age similarity is a weak predictor of tie formation may be expected in an 
environment in which people ―learn on the job‖ from more senior colleagues.  
Interpreting the weak effect of gender similarity on instrumental tie formation is less 
straightforward. In a male-dominated environment imbued with a strong ―macho‖ culture that makes 
                                                     
2
 We also checked our results by running an OLS estimation with business unit fixed effects. All the significant 
coefficients from the multilevel estimation reported before remained significant in this OLS estimation: the 
negative effect of nationality homophily for MDs (-4.03 z-test, p < 0.001), the positive effects for the 
interactions between nationality homophily and the three lower formal ranks (p < 0.001 for all three), the 
interaction between status and nationality homophily (-4.44 z-test, p < 0.001), and the interaction between status 
and gender homophily (-2.09 z-test, p < 0.05). Coefficients that were not statistically significant for the 
hypothesized effects in the multilevel estimations were also non-significant in the fixed effects OLS models.  
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it particularly inhospitable for women, one might expect women might tend to seek help from other 
women. Indeed, our data suggest that, on average, females are more gender homophilous than males. 
The mean gender homophily is significantly higher for women (0.13 versus -0.02 for men, 2.30 t-
value, p < 0.05). Yet, the standard deviation is much larger among women (1.87) than for men (0.72), 
suggesting that there is considerable variance in the extent to which women build instrumental 
relationships with other women in our sample. We also explored whether women benefit or suffer 
from gender homophily, irrespective of their informal status. Specifically, we conducted two 
additional analyses. First, we added an interaction between gender and gender homophily to Model 2 
in Table 3 and ran the model on the entire sample. Second, we ran Model 2 on a subsample that 
consists of women only (n = 281). In both cases, the coefficients of interest (i.e., the interaction term 
and main effect of gender homophily) were not significant. Gender homophily may make it easier for 
some women to get support in the harsh environment of Sales and Trading, but these benefits seem to 
be offset by the costs of not having access to male colleagues, who occupy a dominant position in the 
formal and informal hierarchy of the firm. Gender homophily does hurt all but one of the 10 women 
at the top of the formal hierarchy, presumably due to their high informal status in the organization.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Sociologists and organizational scholars have produced abundant evidence documenting the 
tendency to establish homophilous relationships, but they have largely neglected studying the 
relationship between homophily and outcomes. Our results show that the choice homophily of 
organizational members is related to their performance, but that the nature of this relationship depends 
on the position the members occupy in the formal and informal hierarchy of the organization, as well 
as on the salience of the specific attribute that is considered as a predictor of tie formation. Using data 
on instrumental ties among bonus-eligible employees in the Sales and Trading division of a global 
investment bank, we find that the relationship between choice homophily and performance is 
contingent on the formal and informal status of the banker. Bankers who tend to form instrumental 
ties with colleagues of the same nationality or—to a lesser extent—the same gender receive smaller 
bonuses if they occupy the top echelons of the formal or informal hierarchy of the firm, whereas they 
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do better when they are at the bottom of those hierarchies.  
The model we propose in this paper suggests that the tendency to work with similar 
colleagues could help or hurt the performance of bankers depending on their position in the hierarchy 
of the firm. The nature of our data, however, does not allow us to clearly establish the direction of this 
relationship. Whereas our model suggests that homophily may affect performance, it is also possible 
that homophily would be a consequence of performance. For example, poorly performing bankers 
could find it more difficult to build instrumental ties with colleagues and would need to rely on 
similar others, who would presumably be more sympathetic. This interpretation is consistent with the 
observed negative relationship between homophily and performance for bankers in the upper echelons 
of the hierarchy. However, it cannot explain the positive relationship observed for bankers at the 
bottom. If homophily is the consequence of poor performance at the top, why would it be the 
consequence of good performance at the bottom? If low-status performers are indeed forced to rely on 
homophilous ties due to their poor performance, our results would suggest that this may improve their 
subsequent performance.  
Although the nature of our data does not allow us to clearly establish the direction of the 
observed relationship between homophily and performance, the overall pattern of the results is more 
consistent with the idea that homophily affects performance than with the idea that homophily is a 
consequence of performance. Most likely, both mechanisms are at work. Bankers at the bottom of the 
hierarchy do marginally better if they rely on similar colleagues, as they can access information and 
resources that might have been otherwise unavailable to them. As their performance improves, so will 
their informal status and responsibilities, which would enable (and require) them to build more 
diverse networks. The opposite dynamics may take place for bankers at the top: poor performance 
may force them to rely on homophilous ties, which may further erode their performance, locking them 
into a survival mode from which it may be difficult to escape. 
Our study expands on the idea that the effects of informal networks on outcomes are 
contingent on the position actors occupy in the formal or informal hierarchy of the organization (Burt 
1997, Gargiulo et al. 2009, Galunic et al. 2012). Relying on similar others can help actors secure 
access to information controlled by other organizational members, but it also places constraints on the 
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range and diversity of such information. The costs of this restriction may be negligible for people 
whose performance depends more on the effort colleagues put to help them than on the diversity of 
the information provided by colleagues. These costs, however, become more important for employees 
whose jobs require them to access diverse information. An important implication of this finding is that, 
as employees progress in their careers and perform increasingly complex and critical jobs, they might 
need to adapt their networks, reducing their reliance on similar others to increase the diversity of 
inputs that is required to cope with the new challenges. Employees who do not do so risk being 
trapped in a network that, albeit helpful in the past, becomes a liability for their subsequent 
performance (Gargiulo and Benassi 2000). Like embeddedness, homophily can help the weak, but it 
may hurt them once they become strong (Gargiulo and Ertug 2014) 
In clarifying the relationship between choice homophily and performance, our study 
contributes to the growing evidence on the effects of informal networks on outcomes. Although 
earlier network studies emphasized the effect of network composition (e.g., Lin et al. 1981), research 
since has focused largely on the effect of network structure (see Burt 2005 for a review). Our study 
brings back some attention to network composition as a factor that may influence outcomes above and 
beyond network structure. Structure matters, but so does who is at the other end of a tie. While the 
focus on network structure has been used as a proxy for the resources commanded by the actors in 
that network, our results indicate that who is in the network may also matter for the accessibility of 
those very resources for the focal actor (see Rodan and Galunic 2004, for a related point on network 
composition).  
There are interesting parallels between our work and research on the primacy of interpersonal 
affect over competence in the formation of task-related ties (Casciaro and Lobo 2005, 2008, 2014). 
Insofar as ties of actors with a higher choice homophily are more likely to have positive affect, our 
results indicate that the affective value of relationship can indeed be beneficial for people whose 
position in the formal or informal hierarchy puts them at a disadvantage in securing access to 
colleagues. At the same time, our findings also suggest that choice homophily is negatively related to 
the performance of people whose jobs benefit disproportionally from access to diverse information. 
Although our data do not make it possible for us to measure affect in instrumental ties, it is reasonable 
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to assume that positive affect is more likely in homophilous relationships. If this assumption is true, 
our results would suggest that the primacy of affect over other relevant criteria to select instrumental 
relationships is likely to help people in the lower echelons of the organizational hierarchy, but these 
benefits may disappear and even reverse as people move into higher positions in that hierarchy  
The availability of comprehensive data on instrumental relationships, background, and 
performance allowed us to measure choice homophily in a rigorous way and to assess its relationship 
with performance. Yet, the data also impose limitations to our analysis. The first limitation, which we 
already discussed, pertains to the difficulty in establishing a clear causal relationship between 
homophily and performance, given that we cannot rule out possible endogenous processes through 
which homophily might result from prior poor performance. The availability of lagged performance 
measures might have helped to mitigate this problem, if not to eliminate it completely. Thus, it is 
impossible for us to determine whether the relationship between homophily and performance results 
from ―treatment‖ (homophily causes performance) or ―selection‖ (low performers resort to 
homophilous relationships). The pattern of results, however, suggests that the first is more likely than 
the second: reverse causality could explain the negative effects of homophily for bankers at the top, 
but not the positive effect for those at the bottom.  
The second limitation pertains to the context that provides our data. Although the employees 
in our sample can be considered as typical highly-skilled knowledge workers, the fast-paced nature of 
Sales and Trading in investment banks, the fierce competition among colleagues for large rewards 
that are contingent on performance, and the significant levels of turnover (especially at the entry-level 
rank) define an environment that is not necessarily shared by all knowledge workers. Even as the 
nature of work in more traditional firms is changing, investment banks still present idiosyncrasies that 
require caution when generalizing our results. This caveat notwithstanding, there are no clear reasons 
to believe that homophily along salient attributes would not have similar effects on performance in 
contexts where low-status actors struggle to be accepted as ―legitimate‖ players in the organization 
and where the complexity and diversity of information people require to do their jobs increases with 
their career progression along the formal or informal hierarchy of the firm. 
A third limitation of our data stems from the grid of cross-evaluations between operational 
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units imposed by the bank management. If a banker had ―substantial business interactions‖ with 
someone working in a unit outside the designated set, he or she would not be able to acknowledge this 
instrumental tie. While this possibility is not very likely given the broad matching between units 
based on task interdependence, it cannot be completely ruled out. Yet, the potential unobserved 
heterogeneity in the bankers‘ networks that could result from these limitations is partly accounted for 
by our using a multilevel model with random intercepts, which incorporates the nested nature of the 
data and hence for the effect that the focal banker‘s unit (and therefore the corresponding risk set) 
might have on his/her performance and instrumental network.   
We have argued that the personal affinity and positive affect associated with homophilous ties 
should help bankers in the lowest echelons of the formal and informal hierarchy to access task-
relevant information, leading to a positive relationship between homophily and performance for those 
bankers. Yet, several scholars have also shown that the willingness to help is positively associated 
with the strength of the tie between two parties (Uzzi, 1996, 1997; Hansen, 1999), which is likely to 
be higher between similar parties. It is thus possible that the positive relationship between homophily 
and performance observed for low-status bankers captures the unobserved effect of tie strength. While 
we cannot rule out this possibility due to the lack of a reliable measure of tie strength, three reasons 
lead us to believe that tie strength is unlikely to play a major role in explaining our results. First, the 
positive affect and personal affinity associated with homophilous ties does not necessarily result in 
strong ties, as such ties also require a relatively long period of frequent interactions (Granovetter 1973; 
Marsden and Campbell 1984). Second, most of the bankers who seem to benefit from homophilous 
relationships (typically, low status associates) may not be able to wait until their relationships with 
similar others become strong ties, if they indeed ever become strong ties. This is especially the case in 
an environment in which people and relationships are constantly reshuffled, slowing down the 
emergence of strong personal bonds.
3
 Finally, strong ties are less likely to occur across formal or 
informal hierarchical levels (Lazega and Van Dujin 1997), whereas those are precisely the ties that 
                                                     
3
 Analyzing similar data, Burt (2007) reports that about 70 percent of the instrumental relationships between 
bankers are new each year, including those that were evaluated as ―outstanding‖ the year before, reflecting the 
highly dynamic nature of instrumental ties in this industry.  
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may be more helpful for the low-status bankers who seem to benefit from homophilous relationships. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the positive effect of homophily reported in this study would result from 
the (unobserved) effect of strong ties. 
In seeking to elucidate the relationship between choice homophily and performance, our 
research contributes to our understanding of the possible mechanisms through which this relationship 
operates. Relying on similar people can be an effective survival strategy for people facing significant 
difficulties in securing access to the help and information that they need to carry out their jobs in the 
organization. At the same time, continuing to rely on similar others when it is no longer necessary (for 
example, when organizational actors can secure that access due to their formal and informal status) 
can harm performance, because it can detract such actors from leveraging diverse resources and 
information that are critical to succeeding in their jobs. As is the case with other properties of 
informal networks, whether homophilous ties help or hinder someone‘s performance depends on 
critical contingencies, in this case on the position the actor occupies in the formal and informal 
structures of the organization. 
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Table 1: Variables in the Logistic Regressions Predicting Instrumental Ties  
 
 
Variable Operationalization 
Hierarchy, reporting, 
and rank related 
controls 
Same direct report Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego and alter share the same direct report 
Direct report 
Dummy variable, coded 1 if there is direct reporting relationship 
between ego and alter 
Ego is MD Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego is a Managing Director 
Ego is ED Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego is an Executive Director 
Ego is DIR Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego is a Director 
Ego higher rank than alter Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego has higher formal rank than alter 
Ego lower rank than alter Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego has lower formal rank than alter 
Firm-level controls for 
demographics 
Similar age range in firm 
Number of people in the bank whose age is within 1 standard deviation 
of ego‘s age (i.e. +/-3 years of ego‘s age) 
Same gender in firm Number of people in the bank who are the same gender as ego 
Same nationality in firm Number of people in the bank who are the same nationality as ego 
Induced homophily 
controls in risk set 
Similar age range in risk set 
Number of people in ego‘s risk set whose age is within 1 standard 
deviation of ego‘s age (i.e. +/-3 years of ego‘s age) 
Same gender in risk set Number of people in ego‘s risk set who are the same gender as ego 
Same nationality in risk set Number of people in ego‘s risk set who are the same nationality as ego 
Age, tenure, and gender 
controls for ego and 
alter 
Alter gender Dummy variable, coded 1 if alter is male 
Ego age Ego‘s age 
Alter age Alter‘s age 
Ego tenure Number of years ego has been with the firm 
Alter tenure Number of years alter has been with the firm 
Tenure difference Log of the difference between the tenure of ego and alter  
Reciprocity and 
Common Third Parties 
(Indirect ties) controls 
Alter rated ego Dummy variable, coded 1 if alter rated ego 
Common third parties 
Number of bankers who are connected (either by rating them or being 
rated by them, i.e. ties in either direction suffice) to both ego and alter 
Average rating received 
(quality) controls for 
ego and alter 
Ego average rating received Mean evaluation received by ego across those who rated the ego 
Alter average rating received Mean evaluation received by alter across those who rated the alter 
Similarity indicators (to 
measure choice 
homophily) 
Same nationality Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego and alter have same nationality 
Same gender Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego and alter have same gender 
Alter age within one standard 
deviation range 
Dummy variable, coded 1 if alter‘s age is within 1 standard deviation of 
ego‘s age (i.e. +/-3 years of ego‘s age) 
Same city, same unit, 
and same function 
controls 
Same city Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego and alter work in the same city 
Same operational unit Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego and alter work in the same unit 
Same function 
Dummy variable, coded 1 if ego and alter work in the same function 
(e.g. Research, etc…) 
Indegree and outdegree 
(network size) controls 
Colleagues cited by ego Number of colleagues rated by ego 
Colleagues citing ego Number of colleagues rating ego 
Colleague cited by alter Number of colleagues rated by alter 
Colleagues citing alter Number of colleagues rating alter 
Size of opportunity set 
control 
Ego risk set size Number of people in ego‘s risk set 
Note:  In our homophily measure calculations, the full logistic regression model includes all the variables listed 
above. The reduced model for nationality includes all the variables except Same nationality, the reduced model 
for gender includes all the variables except Same gender, and the reduced model for age includes all the 
variables except Alter age within one standard deviation range. For rank of ego, Ego is AD was the baseline 
category (omitted). For gender, Ego gender was omitted (since with Alter gender and Same gender not all three 
can be included). For rank comparison, the baseline category (omitted) is Ego is the same rank as alter.  
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Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
  Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Performance 0.41 0.39                                       
2 Nationality Homophily 0.00 1.00 -0.04                                     
3 Age Homophily 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.02                                   
4 Gender Homophily 0.00 1.00 -0.07 0.03 0.05                                 
5 Status 0.00 0.32 0.64 0.00 0.11 -0.05                               
6 Age 35.38 6.51 0.26 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.19                             
7 Tenure 1.67 0.83 0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.22 0.35                           
8 Gender 0.16 0.37 -0.15 -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.10 -0.12                         
9 Associate Director (AD) 0.35 0.48 -0.50 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.30 -0.36 -0.18 0.15                       
10 Director (DIR) 0.38 0.49 -0.14 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.17 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.57                     
11 Executive Director (ED) 0.19 0.39 0.30 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.24 0.16 -0.09 -0.35 -0.38                   
12 Managing Director (MD) 0.08 0.28 0.69 0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.70 0.25 0.20 -0.07 -0.22 -0.24 -0.14                 
13 Avg. rating received (ego) 0.00 0.35 0.13 -0.07 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.13 0.05 0.11 -0.02               
14 Avg. rating received (alters) 2.68 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.15 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.09             
15 Direct reports 1.07 3.21 0.48 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.41 0.16 0.17 -0.11 -0.24 -0.16 0.16 0.46 0.09 0.01           
16 Network size acquirer 4.09 0.79 0.15 -0.13 0.03 -0.10 0.28 -0.08 0.12 -0.09 -0.23 0.09 0.22 -0.09 0.16 -0.19 0.10         
17 Network size provider 4.03 0.75 0.59 -0.08 0.08 -0.06 0.79 0.14 0.23 -0.06 -0.37 -0.08 0.20 0.50 0.13 -0.14 0.33 0.53       
18 Network density acquirer 3.58 0.36 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.09 -0.08 0.05 0.09 -0.06 -0.21 0.25 -0.15 0.05 0.02 -0.64 -0.21     
19 Network density provider 3.65 0.40 -0.50 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.63 -0.13 -0.21 0.03 0.25 0.15 -0.17 -0.46 -0.12 -0.06 -0.28 -0.27 -0.63 0.47   
20 Reciprocal ties 0.35 0.14 -0.29 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.30 -0.16 -0.11 -0.03 0.05 0.16 0.02 -0.39 0.11 -0.09 -0.10 0.20 -0.11 0.17 0.48 
 
 N = 1745. Correlations stronger than |0.05| are significant at p < 0.05. 
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Table 3: Multi-level Estimations of the Contingent Relationship between Choice Homophily and Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
   Nationality Gender Age 
Nationality homophily  -0.001    -0.070
***
       -0.006       -0.002            -0.002       -0.002       -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.017) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Gender homophily  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.029       -0.008 0.004 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.052) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age homophily  0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.007 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Status        0.155
***
    0.154
***
    0.162
***
    0.157
***
    0.154
***
    0.145
***
    0.155
***
    0.157
***
 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Age   -0.003
***
    -0.003
***
   -0.003
***
   -0.003
***
   -0.003
***
   -0.003
***
   -0.003
***
   -0.003
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tenure    -0.041
***
    -0.041
***
   -0.042
***
   -0.042
***
   -0.041
***
   -0.041
***
   -0.041
***
   -0.041
***
 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Gender    -0.042
***
    -0.043
***
    0.042
***
   -0.042
***
    0.043
***
   -0.043
***
    0.043
***
   -0.043
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Associate Director (AD)    -0.857
***
    -0.860
***
   -0.867
***
   -0.884
***
   -0.863
***
   -0.857
***
   -0.860
***
   -0.859
***
 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Director (DIR)    -0.692
***
    -0.694
***
   -0.702
***
   -0.718
***
   -0.698
***
   -0.691
***
   -0.694
***
   -0.693
***
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Executive Director (ED)    -0.439
***
    -0.441
***
   -0.449
***
   -0.464
***
   -0.445
***
   -0.438
***
   -0.441
***
   -0.440
***
 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Avg. rating received (ego)    0.095
***
    0.094
***
    0.093
***
    0.094
***
    0.094
***
    0.094
***
    0.094
***
    0.094
***
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Avg. rating received (alters)    0.271
***
    0.269
***
    0.265
***
    0.272
***
    0.269
***
    0.269
***
    0.269
***
    0.271
***
 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Direct reports    0.011
***
    0.011
***
    0.011
***
    0.011
***
    0.011
***
    0.011
***
    0.011
***
    0.011
***
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Network size acquirer 0.019 0.018  0.019
+
 0.019
+
 0.018 0.017 0.018        0.018 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
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Network size provider    0.050
***
    0.050
***
    0.050
***
    0.049
***
    0.050
***
    0.052
***
    0.049
***
    0.049
***
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Network density acquirer 0.041 0.040 0.040        0.037 0.040 0.038        0.039 0.039 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Network density provider       -0.037       -0.037      -0.035      -0.035      -0.038       -0.036      -0.037      -0.037 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Reciprocal ties    -0.158
***
  -0.155
**
  -0.155
**
  -0.152
**
  -0.155
**
  -0.157
**
  -0.154
**
  -0.155
**
 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Homophily * Status      -0.065
***
  -0.077
*
       -0.006 
    (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.009) 
Homophily * AD      0.082
***
        -0.026             -0.003  
   (0.019)  (0.052)  (0.013)  
Homophily * DIR      0.069
***
       -0.024  0.009  
   (0.018)  (0.052)  (0.012)  
Homophily * ED      0.069
***
        -0.024        -0.010  
   (0.021)  (0.053)  (0.018)  
Constant        0.254 0.271 0.285 0.298 0.274 0.270 0.280 0.269 
 (0.250) (0.251) (0.250) (0.249) (0.251) (0.250) (0.251) (0.251) 
N 1745 1745 1745 1745 1745 1745 1745 1745 
 
 
All models include unreported fixed-effects (46 indicators) for the nationality of the banker. These multi-level models account for unit-level differences in the outcome 
variable (as captured by differences in constants, referred to as ―random-intercept‖, similar to how unit-fixed effects would work for OLS models).  
 
For ease of presentation, in the interactions with Status and the formal rank indicator variables (shaded in the table, at the bottom), the variable labeled Homophily 
refers to Nationality [choice] homophily in Models 3-4, Gender [choice] homophily in Models 5-6, and Age [choice] homophily in Models 7-8.  
 
Two-tailed tests *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Plot of the interaction between Nationality homophily and Status 
          
Note: The figure displays estimates of performance for bankers with high (mean plus one standard deviation, 
dashed [red] line) and low (mean minus one standard deviation, solid [blue] line) status. The vertical dashed 
lines delimit the region comprising 98 percent of our observations. 
 
 
Figure 2: Plot of the interaction between Gender homophily and Status 
          
Note: The figure displays estimates of performance for bankers with high (mean plus one standard deviation, 
dashed [red] line) and low (mean minus one standard deviation, solid [blue] line) status. The vertical dashed 
lines delimit the region comprising 98 percent of our observations. 
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